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INTRODUCTION
It is a well-established fact that a firm taking part in an alliance faces a delicate tradeoff regarding the type and amount of information it shares with its partner. On the one hand, the firm has to share knowledge in order to contribute to the success of the alliance. On the other hand, it has to safeguard critical knowledge so that its partner cannot take advantage of it to compete in the future. Unintended information leakage is a very tangible risk that firms face in collaborations and, therefore, a challenge in the management of alliances. This dilemma is especially relevant in R&D collaborations, where knowledge sharing is a very central part of the alliance. Previous literature has emphasized different instruments that help to mitigate the aforementioned risk. One is partner selection, where trust is paramount (Gulati, 1995) . Another is the choice of the scope of the alliance (Oxley and Sampson, 2004) , by which exposure of critical knowledge can be limited. Last, but not least, is the design of alliance governance mechanisms, ranging from the choice of the organizational form (joint ventures vs. contractual arrangements) to the implementation of hierarchical controls and administrative bodies that regulate the alliance (Reuer and Devarakonda, 2012) .
In this paper, we focus on one key decision concerning the protection against the consequences of unintended knowledge leakage in R&D alliances: the selection of the participating employees. We view R&D employees (i.e., inventors) working hand in hand with the R&D employees of the partner firm as the critical factor in safeguarding sensitive information in an R&D alliance. We suggest that the type of knowledge embodied by inventors affects the threat posed by unintended information leakage. Specifically, we claim that inventors who hold knowledge that is better safeguarded against potential imitation by competitors represent a lower threat in the event that technology leakage occurs.
Therefore, we expect that managers will tend to allocate such inventors to collaborative projects.
Previous research acknowledges that employees are an important conduit for unintended sharing of knowledge in cooperative agreements. In a series of case studies on alliances, Hamel et al. (1989) first note that operating employees in the front line de-termine the information that gets traded. Oxley and Wada (2009) and Reuer and Devarakonda (2012) state that uncodified know-how may leak through informal interactions between the personnel involved in an R&D alliance. Participating firms try to control these flows of information between employees and, therefore, the associated potential unintended knowledge leakage. In particular, previous literature points to the use of different types of formal and informal practices, committees or organizational structures that aim to control the amount and type of information that is shared with the alliance partner (among other objectives). Hamel et al. (1989) underline the importance of implementing practices such as advising employees about the valuable information that should not be shared. Oxley and Wada (2009) suggest that alliances organized as joint ventures make it possible to enforce employee conduct rules and manage employee movements, thus limiting informal interactions. These types of monitoring mechanisms can also be replicated in non-equity alliances through the creation of committee structures (Reuer and Devarakonda, 2012) . However, to date the literature has not addressed the strategy of directly intervening in the selection of employees in order to mitigate the risk of leakage. This is despite the fact that innovation studies have shown that inventors play a key role in inter-organizational knowledge transfer and, consequently, in firm learning and innovativeness (Agrawal et al., 2014; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005; Palomeras and Melero, 2010; Paruchuri, 2010; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Singh, 2007; Song et al., 2003) . Therefore, a closer examination of the inventors that participate in R&D collaboration appears to be a promising direction to address the risk of misappropriation and knowledge leakage. This paper contributes to the literature on R&D alliances, specifically to the stream that focuses on the mechanisms that partner firms use to minimize the risk of information leakage. We posit that firms going into collaboration select inventors who hold knowledge that is more protected because, in the event of leakage, the competitor will not be able to use this knowledge effectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic study that analyses R&D alliances from an individual perspective, i.e., taking as the unit of observation the researchers involved in such collaborations. To this end, we rely on inventor data retrieved from patent documents in the pharmaceutical industry, where collaborations are frequent and innovative output is usually patented.
Patent documents allow us to detect: (i) collaborative projects through co-assignments, i.e., patents where more than one institution share the patent holder rights, (ii) inventors participating in these co-assigned patents, and (iii) characteristics of the inventors' knowledge background, including the degree of protection afforded by the patents protecting their innovation portfolio. We examine a sample of large pharmaceutical firms and their patenting activities from 1990 to 2005. Our results suggest that inventors whose knowledge has a higher degree of preemptive power, i.e., that is more protected against potential inventing-around by competitors, are more likely to be allocated to collaborative activities. We find that this effect is more salient for central inventors in the intra-firm co-inventing network and more pronounced when the partner is less trustworthy. These findings suggest that the allocation of inventors is an important factor for reducing the information leakage risk associated with an alliance.
THEORY
One of the main concerns for innovative firms is the risk of not being able to appropriate the returns of their investment in R&D. One of the determinants for this risk is the competitors' ability to replicate knowledge (Teece, 1986) . Thus, when a firm engages in an alliance and exposes some of its body of information to its partner (part voluntarily and part unintendedly), it is likely that the partner learns how to replicate this knowledge, undermining the originating firm's appropriability. This is a real risk that firms face when entering into an alliance and something they have to weigh against the value of the synergistic knowledge that the alliance can yield (Arora and Merges, 2004; Katila et al., 2008) . The firm's decision to enter into an alliance will largely depend on its ability to minimize this threat. This, in turn, depends on two factors: (i) preventing/reducing leakage of alliance-unrelated knowledge, and/or (ii) preventing partners from using knowledge that has been transferred voluntarily or involuntarily.
Avoiding leakage is a matter of constricting knowledge flows to those strictly related to the success of the alliance. This is achieved by organizational structures that can establish mechanisms for tightly controlling the knowledge that flows to the partner (Oxley and Wada, 2009; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2012) . These mechanisms are designed to control the activity of managers and operating employees who interact with the partner and who are the actual conduits for the transfer of information (Hamel et al., 1989; Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven, 2008) . The sharing of information can be easily monitored when it is contained in (and, therefore, probably also transferred through) blueprints and other documents. If the information is non-codified, it is more difficult to establish boundaries to its transfer. This is especially the case if this knowledge involves tacit elements. The tacit dimension of a given piece of knowledge is usually transmitted inherently when working together with the individuals who embody it -these can be the creators of the underlying knowledge or other individuals who learned it through interactions with the creators or previous learners (Zucker et al., 2002) . Therefore, in organizationally embedded collaborations, where individuals from both partners interact repeatedly in an organizational setting, tacit know-how is easily transmitted across firm boundaries (Kogut, 1988) . This makes it difficult to limit its flow and even to realize the extent to which it is being transferred, making it especially prone to unintended leakage. Some alliance structures such as joint ventures constrain knowledge sharing to strictly formalized channels, and, consequently, limit tacit knowledge flows to the strict domain of the alliance (Oxley and Wada, 2009) . Ultimately, nonetheless, the knowledge embodied by the personnel directly involved in the alliance is the key determinant of the potential risk of knowledge leakage. Their tacit knowledge, both related and unrelated to the alliance, is almost inevitably exposed to the partner (Oxley and Sampson, 2004) . Consequently, the assignment of R&D personnel to alliances plays a crucial role in determining the knowledge that the firm puts at risk.
The extent to which leakage can harm the firm will depend on whether competitors end up using this knowledge. Firms involved in an alliance have a range of options to prevent partners from using the transferred knowledge to compete outside the alliance.
One of these mechanisms is to select a partner the firm can trust. This would typically involve either an actor who has developed a strong reputation as a reliable collaborator (Gulati, 1995; Li et al., 2008) or some player who has less incentives to appropriate other firm's knowledge because of limited opportunities outside the focal alliance (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012) . Another mechanism is the use of formal intellectual property protection. Patents, in particular, make transactions in the market for technology smoother because parties are protected against appropriability hazards (Arora et al., 2001) . Having the firm's technology patented also affects the likelihood of engaging in different types of cooperative agreements, as Gans et al. (2002) point out for the case of start-ups. In a more macro perspective, the effectiveness of intellectual property protection in a given sector seems not to significantly affect the likelihood of cooperating (Bönte and Keilbach, 2005) , but it significantly reduces the likelihood that an alliance will fail (Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009 ). According to Oxley (1999) , in the absence of effective protection of intellectual property rights, firms are likely to use other mechanisms, such as hierarchical governance forms, to give the partner the right incentives with respect to the use of the counterparty's technology.
The strength of an individual patent depends on its power to keep competitors at a distance in the technological space, meaning that their products will be well differentiated. This power is determined both by the intrinsic characteristics of the underlying technology (Cohen et al., 2000) and by the firm's patenting strategy. Firms, for instance, may decide to patent broad claims or to build "patent fences" by patenting close substitutes in order to deter competitors' entry into the market (Ziedonis, 2004) , which is commonly referred to as "preemptive patenting". Ceccagnoli (2009) shows that both the effectiveness of protection that a patent confers against the imitation of the firm's innovations and the firm's use of preemptive patenting increase the market valuation of its R&D assets. In the same line, Czarnitzki et al. (2011) suggest that patents that effectively block competitors confer an important competitive advantage to their owner, which translates into a substantial boost of the firm's market value. Findings by Grimpe and Hussinger (2014) indicate that this competitive advantage also generates a higher valuation of the firm if it becomes a target in the market for M&As. Therefore, we expect that in the context of alliances in which firms share knowledge with potential competitors, the preemptive power associated to this knowledge is especially relevant as a protection mechanism against its appropriation by competitors.
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To sum up, we know that, on the one hand, the knowledge embodied by the R&D personnel assigned to alliances is what the firm puts at risk in the collaboration. This selection is, in turn, determined by the knowledge needs of the alliance but it likely includes other knowledge unrelated to it. On the other hand, we know that, if knowledge is covered by strong patents, its use by the competitor is effectively blocked. Therefore, even if leakage happens, the competitor will be unable to appropriate the returns from its partners' knowledge. Consequently, the more protected is the set of knowledge exposed to the partner, the lower is the threat posed by information sharing in general and unintended information leakage in particular. In this setting, the degree of protection of the knowledge embodied by a given R&D employee becomes a relevant factor in assessing the risk a firm incurs when allocating him to a collaborative project. Managers are thus likely to allocate those inventors to external collaborative projects whose knowledge set is strongly protected, i.e., has a high degree of preemptive power. Hence, the more protected is an inventor's set of knowledge, the more likely he is to be assigned to an external collaborative project that has to be staffed.
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1): The greater the preemptive power of an inventor's set of knowledge, the more likely he is to be assigned to a collaborative project.
If an inventor's preemptive power acts as a mean of protection in collaboration, we should observe that its effect on the likelihood that an inventor is allocated to a collaborative project is more relevant in situations where the risk of misappropriation by the partner is larger. We next propose two characteristics that entail different levels of misappropriation risk: (i) the centrality of an inventor in the intra-firm collaboration network, and (ii) the trustworthiness of the collaboration partner.
Inventor's structural centrality
Earlier research has shown that inventors who occupy a more central position the intrafirm co-inventing network have superior access to information and knowledge (Bonacich, 1987) , a higher perception of their quality and a greater number of patent citations made to them (Podolny, 2001; Podolny et al., 1996) ; moreover, they have a significant influence on the selection of the firm's technological path (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005 ) and a greater impact on the quality of their firm's innovative outputs (Paruchuri, 2010) . On the one hand, these findings highlight the potential benefits that such inventors could bring for the success of a collaboration, in terms of highly valuable contributions. On the other hand, their central position is associated with substantial challenges in terms of the risk of technology leakage. Specifically, their access to a large amount and variety of internal information increases the risk that critical information is exposed to the partner. At the same time, the amount of knowledge they put at risk reduces the decision makers' ability to identify and control unintended transfers of important knowledge to collaboration partners (Hwang and Lin, 1999; O'Reilly, 1980) . In contrast, inventors occupying a less central position have (and can, therefore, potentially expose to the partner) a far smaller amount of information, which managers are also better able to assess and control. These conflicting effects related to an inventor's degree of centrality prevent us from making an unequivocal prediction regarding the impact on his likelihood of being assigned to collaboration. However, the fact that centrality is associated with a higher leakage risk suggests that the role of preemptive power in collaborations is likely to be particularly large in the case of central inventors. Hence: HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2): The effect of preemptive power of an inventor's set of knowledge on his likelihood of being assigned to a collaborative project is positively moderated by his level of centrality in the intra-firm inventive network.
Partner-specific and general collaboration experience
As previously mentioned, the selection of a trusted partner in a collaboration may help to minimize the risks of knowledge misappropriation in an alliance. Trusted partners are usually those who have developed a strong reputation in previous collaborations after multiple interactions either with the focal firm (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Li et al., 2008) or with other firms. Specifically, Hitt et al. (2006) reveal that prior ties with the focal firm are positively related to larger contracts in dollar value terms, suggesting that interactions over time lead to greater trust between partners. The network of collaborators in which a firm is embedded also internalizes information about the reliability and trustworthiness of a potential partner that interacts in the network (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) . Moreover, the threat of reputational damage that a potential partner embedded in the network may face in the event of misappropriation provides disincentives to act opportunistically (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) . In the specific setting of R&D collaborations in the pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry, Robinson and Stuart (2007) find that partners with stronger reputation in the community receive larger initial payments, less supervision and less detailed contracts when they engage in alliances. These findings suggest that reputation in the network leads to relationships based on trust, which allows to reduce control on the partner. This evidence conveys the idea that trusted partners reduce the need to guard against technology misappropriation risk. That is, even when the opportunity to act opportunistically may be available, reputed partners are more likely to refrain from doing so. Consequently, we expect that trust in an R&D collaboration should offset the need to allocate inventors with strong knowledge protection. In other words, since the consequences of knowledge leakage are much less dangerous in collaborations with known partners, firms will be less concerned about the degree of protection of the knowledge embodied by the inventors allocated to the collaboration. Conversely, alliances with unfamiliar collaborators pose higher risks of misappropriation, and, therefore, we posit that partners will seek greater protection of the knowledge exposed in the collaboration. Hence: HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): The preemptive power of an inventor's set of knowledge has a greater impact on the probability of his being assigned to collaborate with a non-trusted partner than with a trusted partner.
METHODOLOGY Data
We chose to conduct our research in the pharmaceutical industry for several reasons.
First, R&D collaborations are a significant feature of this sector (Arora and Gambardella, 1990 ). Second, patents are a meaningful measure of innovation in this industry given that they assure firms fairly strong protection of their intellectual assets (Cohen et al., 2000) . As prior research indicates, pharmaceutical firms tend to patent most inventions (Levin et al., 1987) . Through their patenting activities, we can identify firms' R&D activities, both internal and in collaboration with others, and the inventors participating in them. Patent documents also allow us to track these inventors back in time in order to reconstruct their work history and characterize their knowledge background. In order to reliably identify patenting activities that correspond to our sample firms, we need to trace each firm's history to account for any name change, acquisition, foundation or dissolution of entities as well as to identify all of its divisions, subsidiaries, and joint ventures. , and, therefore, accurate identification of patenting histories, thanks to specific disambiguation algorithms for inventor data (see Pezzoni et al., 2014) . In order to identify a given inventor as the employee of a given focal firm at a given point in time, we require 2 See 35 U.S.C. 262 Joint owners and APPI's Group Reports Q194 for European countries.
3 Note that we had to exclude patent applications filed by joint ventures from our sample of patents because we were unable to allocate inventors to any of the individual firms forming the venture in most of the cases. Nonetheless, we use these patents to build the history of the participating inventors.
4 The latest version is available at http://www.esf-ape-inv.eu/index.php?page=3.
him: (i) to be listed as inventor in at least one patent application where the focal firm is the only assignee in the previous five years (i.e., from t − 5 to t − 1), and (ii) not to be listed over the same time period in any other single-assigned patent application with another assignee (i.e., a non-focal assignee). Using these criteria, we identify a total of 10,448 inventors as R&D workers of our sample firms (representing 78 percent of the total number of inventors listed in our original sample of patents).
Dependent variables
Co-assignment
Our main dependent variable, co-assignment, is designed to capture collaborative research activities. Co-assignment takes the value 1 if a given patent is co-assigned between one of our sample firms and another economic institution (e.g., firm, government-affiliated body, university, hospital or research institute) that is not part of the consolidated business group; and 0 otherwise.
The evidence on the use of co-patenting underlines it as a significant phenomenon behind joint technology development, especially in industries with strong intellectual property regimes, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals (Hagedoorn, 2003; Belderbos et al., 2014; Hohberger et al., 2015) . Co-patents, though, may also reflect mere IP sharing arrangements instead of actual collaboration (Belderbos et al., 2014) . In order to ensure that the co-patent status in our sample entails real collaborative efforts between partners, we retrieve additional information on R&D agreements for each pair of co-assignees. For each co-owned patent application, we determined whether it is the result of collaborative technology development efforts in several steps. First, we checked whether the entities in question have alliances on file in the SDC Platinum database. Otherwise, we manually checked corporate websites, SEC filings, industry and trade journals, and news reports.
Only co-patents for which we can identify a record of R&D collaboration are included in our final sample. Our extensive data collection efforts enabled us to identify 93 percent of all co-patent applications as the results of technological partnering activities.
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Partner-specific and general collaboration experience
We follow prior literature and build two categorical variables that proxy for the partner's collaboration experience. We identify previous collaborations through past co-patenting activities, either with the focal firm or other firms. First, we compute partner-specific experience, as in Li et al. (2008) . Specifically, we use the number of co-patents filed for by a given dyad in the past five years to categorize each partner either as a stranger or friend.
The variable is set to 1 when the partner had no patent co-assigned with the focal firm in the past five years (stranger ); 2 when they have at least one common co-patent in the past five years (friends); and 3 when the project is a solitary activity. Second, we compute the partner's general collaboration experience, similarly to Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) .
We employ the partner's number of unique collaborators (excluding the focal firm) for a period of five years prior to the focal observation, and then split the sample into partners with low (= 1) and high (= 2) reputation in the collaboration market based on the sample median (4 partners). This variable also takes a value of 3 when the project is a solitary activity.
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Independent variables Preemptive power
To test our theory, we need a measure that allows the decision maker to assess the extent to which an individual inventor's knowledge is protected. Our identification draws on information from the patent examination process at the EPO. Specifically, we exploit the fact that the EPO patent examiner prepares a detailed search report on the "prior art" upon which an invention is built in order to evaluate whether the patent application in question meets the patentability requirements. 7 The examination guidelines require with no publicly information available. This yields similar results to those presented here. 6 Note that, for collaborative interactions that involve two or more partners, we are not able to compute to compute the abovementioned variables, since each partner may have a different status. This, however, affects only 4 percent of co-patents in our sample (which are dropped for this part of the analysis).
7 Patent applicants at the EPO are not required to report relevant prior art in the application. In consequence, about 90 percent of all patent citations in EPO patents are added by the patent examiner (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008) . The search for prior art follows the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office. These guidelines are available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/ that references to prior art are categorized according to their relevance for the patent application under examination, distinguishing between: (i) conflicting prior art, and (ii) relevant but non-conflicting prior art. In particular, the patent examiner indicates the nature of each piece of prior art with respect to the patent claims by assigning specific code letters, such as A, X or Y (Harhoff et al., 2005) .
In this regard, while so-called "A references" refer to the state of art that pose no threat to the novelty of claims in the application, X and Y citations are potentially harmful. "X references" indicate that the invention in question (or any of its individual claims) might not be considered to be novel if the referenced document is taken into account on its own. "Y references" are applicable if the invention (or any of its individual claims) might not be considered to involve an inventive step when the referenced document is combined with one or more other documents of the same category, such combination being obvious to a person skilled in the art (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008; Harhoff et al., 2005) . Hence, XY-type references refer to conflicting prior art and are considered as "blocking citations". The patent may still be granted in those cases because the conflict may reside in only some of its claims (this is usually the case).
Previous research has shown that patents citing prior art classified as an XY-type have a lower probability of being granted, are more often withdrawn by the applicant before the EPO has made a decision (Guellec et al., 2012) , and have a higher probability of facing opposition after granting (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004) . The literature, therefore, concludes that XY-cited patents exhibit higher preemptive power than other patents. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) and Grimpe and Hussinger (2014) aggregate the share of XYtype citations received by the patents owned by a given firm in order to measure the firm's degree of preemptive power.
Similarly, in order to determine individual-level preemptive power, for every inventor i at every time t in our data, we take the number of XY-type citations that the individual inventor's patent portfolio receives with respect to the total number of citations received up to (but excluding) year t.
8 The variable's range is between zero and one. The larger legal-texts/guidelines.html. 8 Patent equivalents filed at national patent offices are taken into account when calculating this mea-the value of this variable, the higher is the extent to which inventors' patents blocked subsequent patent applications, invalidating the novelty of (some of) their claims.
Inventor's structural centrality
To identify the position of a given inventor in the co-inventing network, we construct an inventor-by-inventor network, which has inventors as nodes and patents among inventors working in the same firm as ties. Following standard procedures, we use a three-year running window. Using the resulting matrix of the one-mode network of inventors, we compute the structural centrality for each inventor using the Bonacich (1987) power measure with standard Matlab code. This frequently used measure has the advantage that, in measuring the centrality of a focal inventor, it explicitly takes account of the centrality of other inventors that co-invent with the focal inventor (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005; Paruchuri, 2010) . Due to the right-skewed distribution of inventor centrality, we use its natural logarithm as the main measure in our analysis.
Control variables
Our analysis employs several individual-related covariates that control for inventor characteristics (observable to the econometrician) accumulated from the beginning of his patenting life up to (but excluding) year t. Specifically, we include ln(total patents), measured as the natural logarithm of the inventor's accumulated number of patents filed until t, to capture his productivity. In order to control for his experience, we measure ln(experience) as the logarithm of the difference in years between t and his first patent priority year. We code firm patents as the proportion of patents applied for by inventor i with the focal firm from his first year until t. We include this measure to account for any differences that might exist between research intensities at the focal firm and previous employers. We also control for knowledge concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of the concentration of the inventor's prior patenting activity across IPC four-digit classes. To account for the inventor's collaboration environment, we include the extent sure. This is important because, if patent equivalents were ignored, the number of forward citations that a patent receives would be underestimated (Harhoff et al., 2005) .
to which inventor i, on average, co-invented with someone with whom he had never coinvented before (new coinventors) and the average number of prior collaborators (team size).
Inventors' ability to generate high-quality output may be related with their allocation to collaboration. Because collaborative research with external partners often entails substantial transaction costs (Gulati and Singh, 1998) , managers may prefer to select workers who can generate particularly high-added value in order to maximize the returns on their investment. Simultaneously, high-quality inventors may be more likely to be the authors of innovations whose patents receive more blocking citations. To account for this, we include citations received (a standard proxy for quality), measured as the average number of citations received by the inventor's patents filed until year t.
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Because allocation decisions may also depend on whether the scientist innovates in a firm's core (or peripheral) technology areas, we control for his experience in the firm's core technology areas. We consider a technology as core if the patent that covers it is classified in an IPC seven-digit class which coincides with some of the most frequent classes in the firm's patent portfolio. We adopt an approach similar to Song et al. (2003) , and identify core classes as those with a frequency greater than 8 percent in a given fiveyear time window. We code experience in a firm's core technologies as the proportion of the inventors' patents applied for with the focal firm that fall in its core classes.
Given that the allocation of R&D workers to collaboration may be affected by their ability to be on the technological frontier and to draw on external knowledge, we include two additional controls. First, we code basicness as the average number of non-patent literature (NPL) citations to total citations made by the inventor in the patents he filed up to t. NPL references have frequently been used as a proxy for the openness to new technological opportunities or for the strength of the science link (Narin et al., 1997; Von Graevenitz et al., 2013) . Second, to capture the degree to which scientists innovate by using knowledge that does not reside within their existing knowledge base, we converted 9 Since there might be concerns regarding systematic differences in citations received by patents from different years and fields, we also experimented with standardized citations (Hall et al., 2001 ). However, using this alternative variable delivered similar results to the unadjusted variable presented here. the scope measure of Katila and Ahuja (2002) to the inventor-level. Thus, for every inventor at every spell, we construct search scope as the average proportion of the citations he made up to t that were not cited by his prior work.
Because inventors who have prior experience in intra-organizational research may be more likely to be re-assigned to this type of project, we introduce a dummy variable, prior co-assignment, that captures whether an inventor has participated in collaborative patenting activities in the previous five years (= 1; otherwise, 0). Finally, to control for the inventor's expertise in specific technological areas related to pharmaceutical research, we include a set of 17 dummy variables for the subclasses (IPC seven-digit) nested within our main IPC four-digit class A61K. All regressions further control for a full set of firm dummies and year dummies. Year dummies refer to the priority year of the focal patent.
10 Thus, we explore how within-firm differences in inventor characteristics relate to within-firm differences in the assignment of inventors, allowing us to control for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity.
Analytical techniques
Our estimation techniques vary according to the nature of the dependent variables. First, we use probit models to examine the probability that a given inventor is assigned to a collaborative versus a stand-alone research activity (H1 and H2). The probit model is appropriate given the dichotomic nature of our main dependent variable: i.e., whether or not it is a co-assigned project. Second, we use multinomial logit models to analyze the likelihood of an inventor being allocated either to a stand-alone project or to a collaboration with a certain type of partner (friend vs. stranger or high vs. low reputation partner; H3). The multiple categorical (unordered) choices captured by this variable make this method necessary. In both cases, every observation corresponds to a patent-inventor pair. Because we need at least one cited patent during the inventor's prior patenting history to construct his degree of preemptive power, inventors with no citation to their previous patents are necessarily excluded from the analysis. This leaves us with a baseline sample of 26,790 inventor-patent observations on 5,297 unique inventors and 13,091 unique patents for our analysis. Standard errors are clustered by inventor to account for the non-independence of observations.
RESULTS
In Tables 1 and 2 , we provide summary statistics and pairwise correlations, respectively.
Our inventors are productive: 15.7 patent applications over a mean patenting life of 9.7 years. On average, an inventor in our sample has a 2 percent probability of being allocated to a collaborative project at a given moment in time and has a blocking citation ratio (or preemptive power) of 0.47. Table 3 presents the specifications that test for our first hypothesis. Column 1 includes inventor-related control variables along with firm dummies, time dummies and technology class dummies. Column 2 adds our main variable of interest, i.e., preemptive power. The likelihood ratio test shows that the inclusion of this variable has a significant effect on the model's explanatory power. More specifically, the positive and significant coefficient estimate indicates that the more blocking citations an inventor's patent portfolio has received, the more likely he is to be assigned to collaboration, in support of H1. To give an idea of the size of this effect, the next two columns display the marginal effects at the means (MEMS) and the average marginal effects (AME). According to the marginal effects results in column 3, keeping the rest of independent variables at their means, an increase in blocking citations from 0 to 100 percent increases the probability of assigning an inventor to a joint project, on average, by 0.7 percentage points. Concerning the mean of the marginal effects predicted for all the observations of the sample (column 4), a shift from 0 to 100 percent in the blocking potential of an inventor's citation stock is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the probability of being selected for collaboration. Given that the baseline probability of being assigned to collaborations is 2 percent, this is a result of economic significance.
In column 5, we differentiate between inventors' preemptive power according to the type of blocking citations. As mentioned earlier, blocking citations can be classified as . This suggests that X references, as citations that directly block claims in patent applications, reflect higher levels of preemptive power than Y references, and, therefore, have a larger effect on the predicted dimension.
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Turning to our control variables, we obtain some interesting insights from the analysis.
The inventor's experience, in terms of the quantity of patents produced, ln(total patents), has a negative effect on his selection for collaboration, while in terms of quality it has no effect (citations received ). However, the percentage of patents with the focal firm (firm patents) has a positive effect. We find a lower likelihood of being assigned to collaboration when the inventor has a more specialized knowledge base in a certain technology field (knowledge concentration), when he co-invents more frequently with new team members (new coinventors), when he worked in larger teams (teamsize) or when he has previously participated in co-assigned patents (prior co-assignment). This last result indicates that allocation decisions are not driven by a sequential allocation of those inventors that are experienced in inter-organizational research.
[Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here] We test our second hypothesis through the specifications presented in Table 4 high centrality (which corresponds to one standard deviation above its mean value or a value of ln(inventor centrality) of 2.01), and (ii) low centrality (which corresponds to one standard deviation below its mean value or a value of ln(inventor centrality) of -0.25).
For the less central inventor, we observe that the probability of selection for collaboration increases moderately with the level of preemptive power. For the more central inventor, this increase is much steeper. While the difference between the two slopes provides indirect evidence in line with H2, it also suggests that both slopes (and the difference between them) change with the level of preemptive power. As Norton et al. (2004) and Hoetker (2007) point out, the interaction between two continuous variables in a non-linear model has different signs and magnitudes across observations. Accordingly, in Panel B of Figure 1, we display the marginal effects of the interaction term for each observation in the sample. We find that they are positive for the vast majority of the sample, though not always significant, as shown in Panel C. Therefore, we obtain partial support for H2. For the sake of completeness, we also report the marginal effects at the mean (column 3) and the average marginal effects (column 4) of preemptive power when centrality (including the interaction term) is taken into account. Not surprisingly, these results are similar to those presented in Table 3 .
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[Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 about here] Table 5 summarizes the results from the multinomial logit models that test for our third hypothesis. Panel A contains evidence related to partner-specific experience. The estimated coefficients compare the effect of being assigned to collaborative activities with either friends or strangers relative to solitary activities. The results show that the effect of preemptive power is to significantly increase the probability of allocating an inventor to a collaborative project with a stranger compared to the omitted solitary category. In terms of the relative risk ratio, the coefficient in column 1 implies that inventors whose blocking citation ratio increases from zero to one are more than twice as likely to be selected for collaboration with a stranger than an internal activity (exp(0.9) = 2.5). The degree of knowledge protection, however, does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of an inventor being allocated to a collaboration with a trusted partner (i.e., a friend). Changing the base outcome to strangers reveals that the difference between both coefficients is significant at the 10 percent level (not reported here). Panel B examines the relationship between inventor's preemptive power and the partner's reputation. The pattern of results is similar to that observed before. Specifically, the greater the preemptive power, the greater the odds of being allocated to a collaborative activity with a partner that has a lower reputation instead of an internal project, whereas the effect of preemptive power on the likelihood to collaborate is not significant in the case of partners with a stronger reputation. Again, the difference between both coefficients is significant at the 10 percent level. In sum, these findings represent strong support for H3, i.e., the degree of preemptive power of the knowledge set put at risk is more relevant in the allocation decision for collaborations with a higher perceived risk of opportunism, particularly those in which the partners are collaborators the firm does not trust.
12 Computing the total marginal effect of preemptive power with respect to centrality (holding all other variables at their means) reveals that the effect is significant for the range of values from −0.36 (the 14 th percentile of ln(inventor centrality)) to 3.77 (the maximum of ln(inventor centrality)) and positive across almost the entire sample (for values of ln(inventor centrality) −1.77, or 98 percent of observations).
[Insert Table 5 about here] In sum, our results indicate that the degree to which an inventor's knowledge is protected plays an important role in inventor selection for collaborative research activities.
We find evidence that is broadly consistent with the conjecture that an inventor's preemptive power is a mechanism that reduces the risk associated with information leakage in collaborations. In particular, our findings suggest that the effect of preemptive power on the likelihood of being assigned to a collaboration is greatest precisely in those cases in which the risk associated with the collaboration is greatest (i.e., more central inventors and collaborations with non-trusted partners).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Since the seminal publication by Hamel et al. (1989) , inter-organizational research efforts have increasingly emphasized the need to protect proprietary knowledge from being exposed to partners. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that so little research has addressed the issue of how the risk of technology leakage is related to individuals that participate in collaborations. This is especially relevant in the context of R&D collaboration where individuals from the two partners work together to produce new knowledge, exposing valuable tacit elements to their counterparty.
In this paper, we perform the first large-scale study of the assignment of R&D employees to external collaborations. By examining the patenting activities of the largest pharmaceutical firms, we are able to detect the contribution of inventors to firms' collaborative activities as reflected in co-assigned patents (compared with their participation in internal projects, reflected in solo-assigned patents). We document patterns that support the argument that managers select specific inventors for R&D collaboration in order to minimize the consequences of information leakage. Our central finding is that the probability that an inventor is assigned to an external collaborative project is positively associated with the strength of legal protection conferred by the property rights that cover the knowledge he (co-)created. This strong legal protection prevents the partner firm from effectively using any leaked knowledge to compete with the creator of such knowledge.
We provide evidence that this effect is more significant for inventors who occupy a more central position in the intra-firm inventor network, and, therefore, whose contribution in an alliance entails a higher hazard due to the quantity and quality of information they hold. Our results also show that inventor's preemptive power is more important in cases where it is difficult to assess partners' trustworthiness, i.e., when the focal firm has had no previous relationship with the partner and/or when the partner has a lower reputation in the alliance market. These findings yield some important contributions. Our results also have implications for the human resource management of R&D employees, in particular for the formation of teams. Our findings suggest that managers select inventors for certain projects (in our case external vs. internal projects) according to the fit between their characteristics and the requirements of the project. Particularly in large and medium-sized firms, where different R&D projects are conducted simultaneously, the allocation of R&D personnel across projects and the resulting teams may be a significant factor behind their success. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to address the question of the allocation of inventors to projects, though in a very specific context. This paper also adds to the literature on the role of intellectual property protection in the market for technology. Our results are aligned with the idea that strong protec-tion facilitates the transfer of information, since fewer moral hazard problems can be expected. We take a new perspective and conceptualize the strength of protection held by an individual by looking at the (patented) innovations he contributed to. We provide evidence suggesting that individual-related preemptive power is an instrument that limits the threat of knowledge leakage in alliances, and, therefore, results in more effective sharing of knowledge between partners. It is plausible that inventors' preemptive power may also be an important determinant for other knowledge "transactions" in which the scientist is involved in the market for technology, including the market for inventors. We leave this to further research.
Though this study generates new insights into the role of inventors in collaborative R&D, our empirical strategy is subject to several limitations. First, the findings of this paper arise from the study of the largest firms in the pharmaceutical sector. This poses two limitations to the generalizability of our results, i.e., regarding firm size and industry. Our argument is based on the possibility of selecting inventors among those potentially suitable (who have the necessary expertise) for an alliance. This requires a set of inventors with partially overlapping knowledge backgrounds who could be allocated, without distinction, to collaboration. We assume that this is typically possible in large, but not necessarily in small, firms. Especially in the latter, this will depend on the degree of specialization of the firm and its R&D workers. Likewise, in other sectors where different mechanisms of knowledge appropriation prevail, preemptive power at the individual level may not confer protection against appropriation. Consequently, we should be cautious about generalizing the results. The second limitation concerns the use of patent data. Although patent data allow for an inventor-level analysis at a large scale that would otherwise be difficult to conduct and, in the case of pharmaceutical firms, they are the most comprehensive data of innovation activities, they present a series of drawbacks. One common downside in studies based on patents is that they only identify successful projects (i.e., those that achieved some output that qualifies for a patent). Another disadvantage, more specific to our study, is that they do not allow us to identify those collaborations that did not result in co-patents. This means that our pool of solo-assigned patents may contain some innovations that are in fact outputs of collaborative research. If there is no particular bias in the decision to co-patent the result of a collaborative project, this potential misclassification problem may lead us to identify an effect that is actually a lower bound for the actual effect. Note that, as we detail in the paper, we avoid the opposite source of misclassification, i.e., the existence of innovations resulting from solo-projects assigned as co-patents as the result of IP sharing agreements.
Our study focuses on the decision to allocate inventors to external collaborations only from the angle of the protection of technological assets exposed in the alliance. We neglect the opposite perspective, that is, organizational learning objectives which may also be relevant for inventor selection decisions. Although we account in our empirical analysis for some dimensions that may proxy for individual-level absorptive capacity, an extension of our study could focus on the learning side of knowledge transfer in collaborative R&D. Do firms learn more from partners when specific inventors are selected? If so, does the knowledge learned from these partners deplete over time because employees involved in collaboration leave the company?
Even with these limitations, we see our study as a first step to understanding the role played by individuals participating in R&D collaborations in the trade-off that firms face when they decide to engage in alliances. As Oxley and Sampson (2004) put it, when setting up an alliance, managers have to make a number of decisions: who to collaborate with, the scope of the alliance and the governance structure to adopt. In this paper, we suggest that managers make another relevant decision when defining a collaboration strategy: which inventors to allocate to the alliance. Predicted probability that y = 1
FIGURES
Panel C. Significance of interaction effects 1990 -2005 . The Likelihood ratio (LR) tests for the increment in the overall model fit after including the preemptive power variable. "MEMS" are the marginal effects at the means corresponding to the probit coefficient estimates in column 2; "AME" are the average marginal effects. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Table 3 , and model 2 is compared with model 1. "MEMS" are the marginal effects at the means corresponding to the probit coefficient estimates in column 2; "AME" are the average marginal effects. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. 
